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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
JOSE A. FIDEL GARCIA,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
:

Case No. 970443-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction for
driving under the influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44.5 (1996) after entry
of a conditional plea pursuant to Rule 11 (i), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, in the Third Judicial District Court, West
Valley Division II, in an for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Judith S. H. Atherton, Judge, presiding.

The trial

court's findings and conclusions were prepared by counsel for the
State and signed by the court on the date of sentencing, May 30,
1997.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
Whether the trial court erred in denying
Defendant/Appellant Jose A. Fidel Garcia's ("Mr. Garcia's")
Motion to Suppress based on the court's interpretation of Utah
Administrative Code R714-500 and ruling that the rules were not

violated.

Additionally, the issue of whether, even if the court

did err in its interpretation of the rules and finding, Mr.
Garcia's test results should be suppressed, or just that the
prosecution is merely precluded from proceeding by hearsay
foundation pursuant to U.C.A. 41-6-44.3.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Statutory construction presents a

question of law that requires no particular deference to the
trial court's findings.

Therefore, we review the trial court's

interpretation for correctness.

Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861

P.2d 443 at 445 (Utah App. 1993).

"Where statutory language is

unambiguous, we look to the plain language of the statute to
determine legislative intent."

Roosevelt City v. Nebeker, 815

P.2d 738 at 739 (Utah App. 1991).

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Garcia's Motion to Suppress the breath test evidence
is preserved in the Record on Appeal ("R.") at 37 and Ruling on
Motion to Suppress Breath Alcohol Test Results ("Ruling").1

The

trial court heard proffer and argument at a hearing on the motion
April 11, 1997, and denied the motion on that date.2

Mr. Garcia

later entered a plea of guilty on May 30, 1997 conditioned on his

1

The
"Ruling on Motion to Suppress Breath Alcohol Test
Results" prepared by the State and signed by the court on May 30,
1997 is attached hereto as Appendix A.
2

The transcript of the Motion hearing is part of the Record
on Appeal, but has not been renumbered. Therefore, references to
the hearing transcript will be noted as "T" with page numbers
cited.
2

preservation of the issue for appeal pursuant to Rule 11(i), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(R. 83.)

RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes and constitutional provisions will
be determinative of the issue on appeal:
Amendment IV, United States Constitution.
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44.3 (1987), Standards for
chemical breath analysis -- Evidence; Section 41-6-44.5
1993), Admissibility of chemical test results in
actions for driving under the influence -- Weight of
evidence.3
Utah Administrative Code R714-500 (1990), Chemical
Analysis Standards and Training.4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition
in the Court Below.
Defendant/Appellant Mr. Garcia was arrested on April 5,
1996 and charged by information with driving under the influence
of alcohol in violation for Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44 (1953 as
amended).

Mr. Garcia moved to suppress the results of a breath

test given at the time of his arrest, claiming that the results
were inadmissible because the Utah Highway Patrol had failed to
comply with administrative rules governing calibration tests on

3

The full text
Appendix B.

of these

statutes

4

is attached

hereto

as

The full text of the relevant Administrative Code provisions
is attached hereto as Appendix C.
3

the breathalyzer machined used in his test.

Specifically, Mr.

Garcia argued that the analytical results of the calibration
tests were not recorded in the permanent record as required by
the administrative rules and standards.

The trial court

conducted a hearing, but took no evidence beyond proffer by the
prosecution.

The State admitted that the technician failed to

record the calibration test results in a permanent record, but
argued that the administrative rule did not require such
recording so the rules were not violated.

In the alternative,

the State argued that the proper remedy even if the rules were
violated should go to the weight of the evidence and not
admissibility.
The trial court interpreted the relevant administrative
rules such that they did not require the recording of the
analytical results of calibration tests in numeric values, and
therefore that the rules were not violated.

As such, the trial

court specifically declined to reach the question of whether, if
the rules had been violated, the remedy should be
inadmissibility.
Thereafter, Mr. Garcia entered a guilty plea to one count
of driving under the influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor.
The plea was specifically conditioned upon the preservation of
Mr. Garcia's right to appeal the trial court's denial of the
Motion to Suppress, pursuant to Rule 11 (i), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and to withdraw the plea in the event that he
prevailed on appeal on the issue of the interpretation of the
4

administrative rule.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial court took no evidence at the hearing on the
motion to suppress the subject test results.5

The argument was

conducted relying on proffer, and the court specifically limited
its ruling to legal interpretation of the Administrative Rule at
issue.

(T. 49.)

Thus, the trial court made no findings of fact,

but only conclusions of law.

Any statements characterized as

"facts" by the State are unsupported by any evidence.

(T. 46.)

Mr. Garcia submits that, for the purposes of this appeal, only
certain "facts" are undisputed:6
On April 6, 1996 the defendant was arrested for D.U.I,
and subjected to a breath test on an Intoxilyzer 5000 machine,
serial number 66-003477 located in West Valley City, to determine
his blood alcohol content.

(Ruling at 1.)

Trooper Hathcock of the Utah Highway Patrol ("UHP"), was
the technician responsible for calibration tests on the machine
at issue pursuant to Utah Administrative Rule R714-500. (Id.)
Also pursuant to the rule, Trooper Hathcock kept a permanent
record of the calibration testing, which he performed at least

5

This was despite defense counsel's request that the hearing
proceed in an evidentiary fashion. See T. at 49.
6

Parenthetical references to the Transcript are therefore
references to portions of the argument wherein they were proffered.
5

once every 40 days.

(Ruling at 2.) 7

Part of the calibration

process involves testing the accuracy of the machine by using
"known reference samples."

(Id.)

The machine analyzes these

samples and quantifies the results using numeric notation.

(Id.)

Trooper Hathcock did not enter the numeric quantifications of any
of the calibration tests performed on the machine between August
23, 1995 and Mr. Garcia's test on April 6, 1996 in the permanent
record.

(Id.)

Instead, he simply wrote "OK" for each test,

indicating his opinion that the results, whatever they were, fell
within the margin of error that is considered acceptable under
the rule.

(Ruling at 2-3.)

Before August of 1995 the three digit numeric results
were recorded in the log by other technicians responsible for
calibration testing.

(T. 21, 44.)

Since the filing of

defendant's motion the numeric results have again been recorded
in the log by Trooper Hathcock.

At no time has there been any

communication between the UHP and Department of Public Safety or
any other agency with regard to whether simply writing OK would
satisfy the rules.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Pursuant to a legislative mandate, the Department of
Public Safety has promulgated rules and standards applicable to
the calibration and maintenance of breath-testing instruments to

7

A copy of the technician's log which represents
permanent record is attached hereto as Appendix D.
6

the

be used for evidentiary purposes.

Included in the rules is the

requirement that calibration tests be performed at least every
forty days, that those tests include analysis of simulator
solutions having known reference samples, and that the analytical
results of such tests be recorded in a permanent record by
writing the numeric quantification of such results to at least
three decimal places.
In this case, the technician responsible for performing
the calibration tests in Salt Lake County did not record the
analytical results as required by the rules for approximately
nine months preceding the arrest and testing of Mr. Garcia, and
for approximately one year following his test.

In the spaces

provided in the permanent record book for recording the
analytical results of the simulator tests, the technician simply
wrote "OK", signifying that he believed that the results fell
within a certain range allowable under the rules.

Mr. Garcia

argues that the failure to record the numeric results of the
calibration test is clearly a violation of the rules, that the
violation is a substantial violation, and that results of Mr.
Garcia's test should therefore be inadmissible at his criminal
trial.
Though the trial court took no evidence and specifically
limited its ruling to an interpretation of the administrative
rule, the State argues that even if the rules were violated, the
remedy should not be exclusion or suppression of the subject test
result.

Instead, it argues, the issue goes to the weight of the
7

evidence, and the State should be allowed to call the technician
as a witness to provide foundation for the admissibility of the
test result, subject to defendant's right to cross-examine on the
issue of the rules violation.
Even if this Court were to consider these alternative
grounds not considered by the trial court, the remedy should be
exclusion or suppression for any one of three reasons.

First, by

operation of the administrative rule itself, if the programmatic
testing requirements have not been complied with, the intoxilyzer
machine is not "certified," and therefore the subject test
results are not admissible.

The administrative rule sets out the

minimum requirements for reliability and scientific integrity of
breath test results, and thus evidential foundation.

Since the

rules were not complied with, Mr. Garcia's test result could not
withstand a foundational objection were it made at trial.
Second, where, as here, the State issues a mandate and delegates
the authority to promulgate rules relating to the collection and
preservation of evidence to be used against an individual in a
criminal prosecution, and the rules are violated--especially at
the programmatic level--it is axiomatic that the subject's due
process rights have been violated and the results must be
suppressed.

Thirdly, the legislature has had ample opportunity

to state that violations of the administrative rules should only
go to weight and not admissibility, and no such directive has
been issued.
Because the administrative rules clearly require
8

recording of the numeric results of the calibration tests to
three decimal places, the trial court's ruling should be
reversed.

Even if this Court considers Appellee's other grounds,

the violation of the rules should result in exclusion or
suppression of the Mr. Garcia's test results.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE HAS BEEN VIOLATED

The plain language of the Administrative Rule R714-500
("the rules') requires that when the Utah Highway Patrol performs
calibration tests on intoxilyzer machines it record the results
in a permanent record, and that the numeric values of those
results be recorded to three decimal places.

Although the UHP

did properly record results in such a manner before August of
1995, and has returned to that practice since the filing of this
Motion in April of 1997, during the nine months preceding
defendant's arrest and year since the numeric results were not
recorded.

Therefore the rules were substantially violated.

The

trial court interpreted the rule such that it does not require
that the numeric values be recorded.

(T. 45-46, 49.)

That

ruling is clearly incorrect according to the plain language of
the rules.
Where an individual submits to a breath test in the
course of a D.U.I, arrest, the testing must be accomplished by
use of Intoxilyzer devices approved for the collection of
evidence for such purposes and by such means.
9

Utah Code Ann.

Section 41-6-44.3

(1953 as amended).8

Pursuant to this

legislative mandate, the Department of Public safety has
promulgated rules in the Utah Administrative Code at R714-500,
which dictate the standards and requirements that the Utah
Highway Patrol

(as the agency responsible for maintenance of

breath testing devices) must follow.9
According to R714-500-5(A): "All breath alcohol testing
instruments . . . to be used for evidentiary purposes must be
certified."

And, "[i]n order to be certified each brand and/or

model of breath testing instrument must meet the

[requirements

8

U.C.A. 41-6-44.3, Standards for chemical breath analysisEvidence , states:
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety
shall establish standards for the administration and
interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath,
including standards of training.
(2) In any action of proceeding in which it is material
to prove that a person was operating or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited,
documents offered as memoranda or records of acts,
conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was make
and the instrument used was accurate, according to
standards established in Subsection (1), are admissible
if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the
regular course of the investigation at or about the
time of the act, condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and
the method and circumstances of their preparation
indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established
under Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2)
have been met, there is a presumption that the test
results are valid and further foundation for introduction
of the evidence is unnecessary.
9

The relevant portions of such rules are attached hereto as
Appendix C.
10

set out in the rule]."

Id, at R714-500-5(B).

Those requirements

include routine certification at least every forty days.
500-6(D)(3).

R714-

The calibration test to certify the instruments

must include testing of at least eight separate operations.
R714-500-6(D)(4).

Two of the eight categories of information

that must be recorded include "known reference samples" and
"reads in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath."
results must be kept in a permanent record book.
6(D)(5).

Id.

The

R714-500-

The results must be recorded in the book in certain

designated numerical terminology: "All analytical results shall
be expressed in terminology . . . and reported to . . . three
decimal places for a 5000 series intoxilyzer.

(For example . . .

0.237g/210L shall be reported as 0.237 on 5000 series
intoxilyzer, . . . ) "

R714-500-6(D)(6) (emphasis added).

In the instant case, the mandatory procedures cited above
have not been followed with regard to the certification of the
intoxilyzer machine used to test the Mr. Garcia.

The UHP did not

write the analytical results of the simulator tests in the
permanent record.10

Instead, the technician wrote only "OK" to

indicate his belief that the results, whatever they were, were
within the variances stated elsewhere in the rules.11
The State argues, and the trial court held, that the
administrative rule does not in fact require that the results of

10

See technician's log in Appendix E.

1:L

See Appendix C. The Code allows variance of .005 grams or
5 percent, whichever is greater. R714-500-5B(3).
11

the calibration tests be recorded in the permanent record in
numeric quantification.

This conclusion is incorrect.

The text

or the rules at R714-500-6D(6) could not be more plain and
unambiguous.

It even provides an example, using the mandatory

language "all analytical results" and "shall be reported," and
using numerals.

Statutory construction in Utah is well settled:

Rules are to be construed according to their plain language,
assuming that the words were used advisedly, and no room is left
for construction.

State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992);

State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 1997).

Before

Trooper Hathcock took charge of testing the machine at issue in
this case the numeric quantifications were specified in the
record, and that since the filing of this motion Trooper Hathcock
has again begun to so specify the results.

The rules nowhere

suggest that UHP may merely indicate that the calibration results
were within allowable variances instead of reporting what the
results actually were.

The Department of Public Safety has never

provided UHP with any interpretation that suggests that such a
reporting tactic would satisfy the rule.12
The state seemingly argued, and the trial court seemingly
ruled, that the three decimal requirement refers to what the
machine must do, not what the technician must record.

(T. 47.)

Such an interpretation makes no sense, for the machine cannot
possibly express the results in any way other than numerically
12

Moreover, the cases discussed in the sections infra evidence
that such reporting requirements exist throughout the country and
raise evidential issues.
12

and to three decimal places.

Moreover, the whole rule is

dedicated to outlining the required duties of the technician
relevant to testing the machines and reporting the results in a
permanent record.

It is a rule for technicians, not for

machines.
The State may also argue13 that the recording
requirement at issue applies to a subject test result.

The

argument has been that the numeric reporting requirement applies
not to calibration tests, but to subject tests.

(The trial court

specifically discarded such a reading of the rule.
9-13.)

T. 47, lines

There can be no question in reading the rule as a whole

that the requirement applies to calibration tests.

The

requirement and example are found in subsection six of the
"Program Certification" portion of the rule, and follow directly
after the 40-day calibration and permanent record requirements
(subsection four) and the list of things to be tested and/or
analyzed (subsection five) which only apply to calibration
testing.

Moreover, the rule deals with requirements of

"operators" during "breath" tests in a different section at R714500-6(D)(1) and (2). Those tests are performed by certified
"operators,"

not "technicians."

R714-500-7, 8.

Subject test

results are breath tests, whereas calibration tests are tests on
known reference samples, and the results of the former are
recorded by the operator who gives the test in a completely
13

While the State did not make this argument to the trial
court in this case, it has been made in arguing this issue before
other courts.
13

different log book which is kept at the site of the testing
machine.14

At any rate, the only thing the State's argument

could mean is that R714-500-6(6) applies to the recording of both
breath test results and calibration test results, since that
subsection refers to "all analytical results."
The trial court's interpretation enjoys no deference on
appeal.

It is clear that the interpretation of the relevant

administrative rules is incorrect, and that the rules have been
violated in this case.

Therefore, this Court should reverse the

trial court's ruling on that issue and Mr. Garcia should be
allowed to withdraw his plea.

II.

DEFENDANT'S TEST RESULT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED

The trial court declined to consider the question of
whether a violation of the administrative rules should result in
a finding that Mr. Garcia's test result is inadmissible, or
merely that the State may not proceed pursuant to 41-6-44.3 which
creates a presumption of validity and allows for foundation by
hearsay.

The State nevertheless requests that this court reach

the issue of remedy as an "alternative grounds" argument against
suppression.

In his Memorandum in Response to State's Motion for

Summary Affirmance Mr. Garcia noted that consideration of an
"alternative grounds" analysis would be improper.

14

However, since

An example of that log book record is attached hereto as
Appendix E.
14

many of the cases that will be impacted by this decision15 have
been stayed in the trial courts pending the decision in this
appeal, instead of being appealed and consolidated, and since Mr.
Garcia believes that principle and precedent argue for
suppression, he would not now object to this Court reaching the
issue of remedy.
A.

Defendants test result is inadmissible
because the State cannot lav proper foundation
for its admission.
i.

Since the administrative rule was
violated the defendant's test result
is not "certified" and is therefore
inadmissible under the Rule itself.

By operation of the Administrative Rule itself, if the
rule is violated, a test result is not "certified," and therefore
it is not admissible.

U.C.A. 41-6-44.3 is titled "Standards for

chemical breath analysis--Evidence,"16 and mandates in
subsection one that the Department of Public Safety determine the
minimum standards and requirements for reliability and
foundation. Subsection two discusses the circumstances under

15

This motion has been considered by every court in the Third
District, Division II, Salt Lake Department and West Valley
Department, as well as most Justice Courts in Precinct Four. The
results have been varied.
One other court has held that the
administrative rule does not require numeric notation, for a
different reason than the trial court in this case.
All other
courts have held that the rule was violated, but have split on
whether the violation goes to the weight of the evidence or renders
the result inadmissible.
This Court recently denied Salt Lake
City's petition for interlocutory appeal from a trial court's
ruling that the administrative rule was violated and the subject
test was therefore inadmissible.
16

The entire text of 41-6-44.3 can be found at footnote 8 supra and Appendix B.
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which the prosecution may lay foundation for admission into
evidence of specific subject tests by use of affidavits instead
of live testimony. In so doing the statute states that the issue
of accuracy is determined "according to the standards established
in Subsection (1), . . . "

Jd.

Subsection two also relates two

additional findings that a court must make related to reliability
of the affidavits themselves.

Subsection three again iterates

that a judge must specifically find that both the standards
established under subsection one and the conditions of subsection
two have been met, or there is no presumption that the results of
the subject test were valid and the State may not lay foundation
as otherwise provided in the statute.

See, e.g., Murray City v.

Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983); Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788
P.2d 1062 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
subject test is inadmissible.

Absent other foundation, the
Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413

(Utah 1987) .
Not only does a failure to follow the rules render the
hearsay allowance of 41-6-44.3 inapplicable, a violation such as
the one in this case renders the subject's breath test
inadmissible at trial.

This is because the rule itself only

allows for the admissibility of certified results: "All breath
alcohol testing instruments . . . to be used for evidentiary
purposes must be certified."

R714-500-5(A), and "[i]n order to

be certified each brand and/or model of breath testing instrument
must meet the [requirements set out in the rule]."
5(B).

R714-500-

Certified results are results from certified machines
16

following a certified program.

"Certification" therefore

requires following the administrative rules.

This proposition is

also supported by reference to cases from other jurisdictions.
For instance, in Lake v. MVP, 892 P.2d 1025 (Or.App. 1995)
discussed below, the Oregon court interpreted the term
"certification" to require a signature of the technician on
relevant forms and held that absent the signature on calibration
results the calibration was not "certified" and therefore the
subject test was not admissible.

Also, in Westerman v. State,

525 P.2d 1359 (Okl.Cr. 1974) the defendant appealed from the
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress based upon the
prosecution's failure to demonstrate that the administrative
rules relevant to calibration testing had been complied with.
Citing to a statutory and administrative framework similar to
Utah's, the appeals court ruled that the prosecution carried the
burden to prove that the administrative rules had been complied
with, or the results would be inadmissible.
Since 1974 the administrative rules in Oklahoma have been
substantially embellished, as has happened in Utah, but Bryant v.
Com'r of Dept. of Public Safety, 937 P.2d 496 (Okl. 1996)
demonstrates that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma still follows the
holding and wisdom of Westerman.

In Bryant, the defendant's

drivers license was revoked after a hearing and he appealed. The
issue on appeal was whether a subject test result was admissible
where the State did not follow its administrative rule (requiring
a test sample to be retained for 6 0 days).
17

The Oklahoma Supreme

Court cited to Westerman in holding that where the rules require
that a sample be retained, and it is undisputed that a sample was
not retained, allowing the prosecution to admit the subject test
results "would effectively render both the statute and the rule
useless," and the results were therefore inadmissible as a matter
of law.

Id. at 501.
Thus, according to statute, the admissibility of

intoxilyzer results, whether through affidavit or live testimony,
is determined by whether the Department of Public Safety
standards are followed.

Those standards are found in the form of

rules promulgated in the Utah Administrative Code at R714-500.
The Rules themselves require that " [a]11 breath alcohol testing
instruments . . . to be used for evidentiary purposes must be
certified . . . ."

R714-500-5A (emphasis added).

In order to be

certified each individual instrument must meet certain criteria
pursuant to a certified program.17

In this case the reporting

requirements of R714-500-6D(5) through (6) were violated.

Since

the rule was violated, then the program cannot be certified.
Since the program is not certified, then the machine is not
certified, and therefore Mr. Garcia's test result from that
machine is not certified, not reliable, and not admissible.

ii.

Since the administrative rule was violated
the minimum statutory requirements for
admissibility cannot be met.

By reasoning similar to the argument in the preceding
17

See discussion in Section I, supra.
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section, since the administrative rules are created to ensure
reliability of breath test results, if they are not complied
with, test results could not meet legal requirements for
evidential foundation.

The administrative rules regarding

calibration testing can be viewed as the statutory mandate for
that which is minimally necessary to ensure reliability of
evidence sought to be introduced against a defendant in a
criminal trial.
requirements.

Reliability is the cornerstone of foundational

Therefore, the rules represent the minimum showing

the prosecution must make in order to survive a foundation
objection at trial.

Thus, if the rules were violated, sufficient

foundation could not be demonstrated, and the subject test would
be inadmissible as a matter of law.
Other State courts have ruled precisely along such lines
on cases involving breath testing regulations and evidence. For
instance, in State v. Fogle, 459 P.2d 873 (Or. 1969) the
defendant argued that strict compliance with the administrative
rules relating to breath testing was a prerequisite to
admissibility of subject test results.

In that case the state

failed to follow the rule requiring calibration tests within 60
day intervals.

As in the instant case, the prosecution there

argued that the court should presume that the rule was complied
with, but even if there was a violation, it should go to weight
and not admissibility.

The Oregon Supreme Court did not agree,

stating that not only was it the prosecution's burden to prove
compliance with the rules,
19

[m]ost cases have held that strict compliance with
similar statutes must be shown as a prerequisite to the
introduction the results of the test. Jones v. City of
Forrest City, 239 Ark. 211, 388 S.W.2d 386 (1965);
State v. Fox, 177 Neb. 238, 128 N.W.2d 576 (1964); and
State v. Powell, 264 N.C. 73, 140 S.E.2d 705 (1965),
all hold that in order for chemical test evidence to be
admissible the state must first establish that the
particular test method employed had been officially
approved by the state agency.
Id. at 876.

The court went on to cite examples, such as where a

test was not performed by a person with a proper permit in
violation of regulation, or where a regulation requiring certain
sterilization of needles was not followed.

Id.

The rationale in

Fogle has been followed as recently as 1995 by Oregon courts.

In

Lake v. MVP, 892 P.2d 1025 (Or.App. 1995) the court cited Fogle
in support of its ruling that failure to comply with
administrative regulations relevant to chemical testing renders
the subject test result inadmissible.

In that case the court

ruled that the administrative regulation required the agency to
test and certify equipment, interpreted certification to require
a technician's signature on the calibration test results, and
held that since the technician did not sign the test result card
the result was not certified, the rule was not complied with, and
the subsequent subject breath test result was inadmissible.

See

also, Keel v. State, 609 P.2d 555, 558 (Alaska 1980) (discussed
below); Klebs v. State, 305 N.E.2d 781 (Ind. App. 1974, cert.
denied 419 U.S. 869, 42 L.Ed. 107, 95 S.Ct. 127; State v. Krause,
405 So.2d 832 (La. 1981) (state must show that methods,
procedures and techniques to ensure integrity of results have
been promulgated, and that the state has strictly complied with
20

such rules); State v. Hall, 315 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio App. 1974)
(prosecution failed to prove compliance with Department of Health
regulations with regard to calibration testing solution, so
subject test results were inadmissible); State v. Fellows, 352
N.E.2d 631 (Ohio App. 1975) (proper calibration of breathalyzer
machine as an incident of its being in proper working order
according to health department regulations is a necessary
prerequisite to the admission of test results); State v. Dyer,
233 S.E.2d 309, 311, 310 (W.V. 1977) ("To be admissible in
evidence at

trial [for D.U.I.] the results of a breathalyzer

test administered to such person 'must be performed in accordance
with methods and standards approved by the state department of
health. ,n

"[N]ecessary foundation before admission includes . .

. that there was compliance with any statutory requirements.");
State v. Wills, 359 So.2d 566 (Fla.App. 1978) (because a gun
locker key was found to enable unlocking of the breath testing
machine, and regulations stated that the machine shall only be
accessible to authorized technicians, the rule was violated and
the subject test results were inadmissible.

The court cited

numerous cases from other jurisdictions in support of the
proposition that violation of calibration rules renders subject
breath tests inadmissible.).
In this case, the failure of the UHP technician to
properly record the analytical results of the calibration tests
in numeric notation to three decimal places renders the
subsequent test of Mr. Garcia inadmissible.
21

B

*

By violating its own promulgated rules and
standards, the State has violated Mr, Garcia's due
process rights.

It is axiomatic that when a government undertakes to
legislate rules, procedures and standards to govern the exercise
of its power, a right to due process is created.

It is also

axiomatic that when the government then fails to follow the rules
and standards that it has thereby created, the results of its
endeavors are inadmissible against an individual facing criminal
prosecution.

This is particularly true in a case such as this

where the very rules and standards specifically recognize that
they apply to processes designed to create results for
evidentiary purposes.

In this case allowing the government to

offer evidence under such circumstances would violate the
defendant's due process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, and under Article
I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution.
The courts are the only check to protect against the
arbitrary and capricious use and abuse of governmental power in
cases such as this.

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that an

agency of the government must scrupulously observe the rules,
regulations and procedures which it has established pursuant to
mandate, and that when the agency fails to do so its action
cannot stand and the courts must not allow use of the fruits of
such actions.

United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaghnessv, 347

U.S. 260 (1954);

United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1970).

Courts routinely hold government agencies strictly responsible
22

for following their own code as a matter of due process.

See,

e.g. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1970) .
The State has tried to avoid due process considerations
in this case by minimizing the extent of the violation and
claiming that even if the rules have been violated the violation
does not rise to constitutional proportions.

The tactic is to

misleadingly refer to the violation in this case as a
"bookkeeping" error.

In so doing, the State cavalierly

insinuates that the rule is not important.

However, it is not

within the province of the prosecution (or indeed even the
courts) to make such suppositions.

The Department of Public

Safety saw fit to require that certain analytical results be
recorded in a permanent record in specified notation.
not done.

That was

No other rule or directive from the Department exists

to suggest that a simple "OK" in the section of the record
reserved for recording the numeric quantification is a
satisfactory substitute.

There are many obvious reasons that a

defendant may want access to the information that is not
available in the permanent record.18
By referring to the rules violation as a bookkeeping
error, the State not only attempts to minimize the scenario, but
seeks to employ case law which is not on point as precedent.

For

instance, this Court in State v. Vigil, 772 P.2d 469 (Utah App.
1989) held only that "bookending" was not a foundational
18

The trial court itself noted that recording the information
"might be wise policy" for the various reasons articulated in the
course of Mr. Garcia's argument below. T. at 45-46.
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requirement: that the State need not show that a successful
calibration test was performed before and after the date of the
subject test.

There was no issue as to whether calibration

testing had otherwise been properly performed according to the
administrative rules and thus by a certified program and machine.
The State relied most heavily on Salt Lake City v.
Emerson, 861 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1993).

However, a careful look

at the holding, dicta and reasoning in that case shows that it in
fact supports Mr. Garcia's argument.

In Emerson, the defendant

asserted that the arresting officer performing a breath test on
the defendant failed to comply with the administrative rules
because he did not retain a separate checklist for each of three
tests given to the defendant.
analytical results.

The first two tests did not render

The third test did, and the checklist for

that test was completed and retained.

This Court found that the

officer in fact did comply with the regulation.

Id. at 447.

This Court then went on in dicta to state that even if
the officer's actions had amounted to a technical violation of
the rule, it would not necessarily "follow that suppression is in
order . . . [where] any deviation from the standards" is found.
Id.

The State grasps this thread and attempts to build a bridge

to its conclusion that failure to follow the rules should never
result in suppression.

However, by this Court's own explanation

and reasoning in Emerson, it is clear that where a violation
exists at the programmatic calibration, designed to ensure
integrity and reliability of subject test results, the remedy
24

must be suppression.

For in Emerson, this Court supported its

dicta by reference to Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574
P.2d 801 (Alaska 1978).

In that case the Alaska Supreme Court

held that a technical oversight by the officer administering the
subject breath test (failing to check one of the boxes on the
checklist) should not result in suppression under a "substantial
compliance"

due process standard.

The comparison to the

scenario in Emerson is obvious--both involve subject breath tests
and alleged technical violations dealing with the checklists used
at the time of the subject tests.

However, two years later the

Alaska Supreme Court clarified Oveson in a case involving a
scenario much more similar to the instant case, and held that the
test results were inadmissible where rules were violated in the
course of calibration testing of the machines.
In Keel v. State, 609 P.2d 555 (Alaska 1980) the
prosecution failed to present evidence that the person who
performed calibration tests was an "instructor" as required by
the administrative regulations.

(This was a seemingly technical

violation in that the witness had testified that he was a
certified calibration tester, but had not used the term
"instructor.")

The court ruled that, since the regulations were

violated at the calibration level, necessary foundation for
admission was not established, and substantial compliance could
not be found.

In so ruling, the court specifically clarified the

difference between Oveson and Keel:
Oveson involved the inadvertent failure of the police
officer administering the test to check one box on the
25

"Breathalyzer Operational Checklist." We found
substantial compliance because the officer testified at
trial that he had in fact performed the step that he
had neglected to check.
[Cite omitted.] We noted that
"the crucial concern is that the breathalyzer test be
performed in a manner that assures accuracy according
to the statutorily approved methods . . . and
determined that that concern had been alleviated. We
cannot reach the same conclusion here. The requirement
that calibration be done by a qualified instructor
indicates that calibration must be done skillfully to
be accurate. The state's failure to show that Oldham
was properly qualified, therefore, casts doubt on the
accuracy of the calibration and hence on the
reliability of the results of Keel's blood alcohol
test.
Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
clear and sound.

The Alaska court's reasoning is

Where there is a technical violation by an

operator at the level of the subject's breath test, the remedy
may not be suppression.

But where there is failure to strictly

follow the rules at the level of calibration testing, the level
specifically created to address concerns of general reliability
and accuracy, substantial compliance cannot be met, and the
subject test is inadmissible. In the instant case the violation
is particularly substantial in that it deals with a failure to
maintain a permanent record of the only analytical information
that is generated by the calibration process.

The violation

occurred at the programmatic level and the result of the
violation is that specific quantifications are kept out of the
permanent record and therefore are unavailable to the defendant,
scientists, or other technicians seeking to evaluate a machine's
performance.
months!)

(The informational void lasted for nineteen

The purpose for the recording requirement is obviously

to ensure scientific integrity and reliability by preserving
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actual results so that other individuals may review data gathered
over time and assess potential problems or inaccuracies.

This

Court, in Emerson, found Alaska's reasoning sound, and should
likewise follow the clarification of such reasoning in Keel.
Other cases directly on point support such a conclusion.
For instance, in State v. Brown, 672 N.E.2d 1050 (Ohio App. 4
Dist. 1996) the Ohio court dealt with a very similar regulatory
scheme and issue.

There, as here, the Ohio Administrative Code

required that the certification record reflect the results of
calibration tests in numeric quantification to three decimal
places (the exact same rule as in Utah, and one which it seems is
found nation wide).

The record in fact only reflected the

results to two decimal places.

The defendant argued that the

rule was therefore violated and the subject test should be
suppressed.

The court agreed, stating that "[s]ubstantial

compliance with administrative rules is required for
admissibility" and reporting to two decimal places where the rule
required three was not substantial compliance.

Id, at 1051-52.

In State v. Koch, 671 N.E.2d 333 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. 1996), the
Ohio court again held that breath test results should be
suppressed where administrative rules are violated at the
calibration level.

In that case the relevant rules required

radio frequency interference surveys of all three frequency
bands.

The court found that a survey of one or even two of the

bands did not comply with the rule, and ordered the subject test
suppressed.

(See, also. People v. Orth, 330 N.E.2d 210 (111.
27

1988), holding that the requirement of compliance with the
administrative rules relating to calibration of breath test
machines applies both to criminal proceedings and civil license
revocation proceedings.)
In this case, the administrative rules and standards have
not been followed, the violations have occurred at the
programmatic level specifically designed to ensure integrity and
reliability of results, the violations relate to the most
important aspect of the program: the only analytical results of
calibration process.

As such, the violations are clearly a

substantial noncompliance, and due process considerations require
suppression of Mr. Garcia's subject test results.

C

Despite the opportunity to do so, the legislature
has not declared that failure to follow the rules
should result in anything other than suppression.

The State's argument that the violation of the Rule in
this case should result only in disqualifying the prosecution
from proceeding with hearsay foundation under 41-6-44.3 is not
supported by the D.U.I, statutes read altogether.

In fact, the

legislature has specifically addressed the fact that rules or
procedures may not be followed, and has carved out certain
instances where such failures should nonetheless not result in
outright suppression of chemical test evidence.

U.C.A. Section

41-6-44.5 (1993) specifies such circumstances.19

For instance,

19

41-6-44.5 states: Admissibility of chemical test results in
actions for driving under the influence -- Weight of evidence.
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under 41-6-44.5(1) (b) , noncompliance with the procedures outlined
in 41-6-44.10 does not render test results inadmissible.
Likewise, under 41-6-44.5(2) failure to follow the "two hour
rule"20 goes to the weight of the evidence, but does not
necessarily render the test result inadmissible.
However, 41-6-44.5 is conspicuously silent as to the
effect of failure to follow the mandates of 41-6-44.3 and the
standards and rules promulgated pursuant to that section.

This

notwithstanding that 41-6-44.5 and 41-6-44.3 were enacted in the
same legislative action in 1979.

Since the legislature obviously

had the opportunity to include failures to follow 41-6-44.3 and
(1) (a) In any criminal or civil action or proceeding in which it
is material to prove that a person was operating or in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs or with a blood alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests as
authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence.
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 416-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical test
inadmissible.
Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath
alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when
prohibited by rules of Evidence or the constitution.
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the
alleged driving or actual physical control, the test result is
admissible as evidence of the person's blood or breath alcohol
level at the time of the alleged operating or actual physical
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight is given
to the result of the test.
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving
otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath
alcohol level or drug level at the time of the alleged operating or
actual physical control.
20

U.C.A 41-6-44 (2) (a) states that
a person may not operate or be in actual physical control of
a vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within
two hours after the alleged operation or physical control
29

the administrative rules in the category of shortcomings that go
to weight but not necessarily admissibility, and they did not
include them, it should be surmised that the absence is advised
and intentional, and that violations such as the ones at issue in
this case result in inadmissibility.

REASONS WHY ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED AND OPINION
ISSUED,
Oral argument and a published opinion reversing and
remanding this case to grant the Motion to Suppress would clarify
the state of the law regarding compliance with the administrative
code provisions regarding breath testing and calibration of
breath testing machines.

Such a ruling would provide consistency

with current case law and send the message that the State is
responsible for complying with its own rules if it intends to use
the powerful evidence generated by scientific machines that are
neither run nor calibrated by scientists.

Such a ruling would

work similarly to exclusionary rule principles that generally
apply to search and seizure cases, as well as principles which
apply to enforcing rules promulgated pursuant to statutory
mandate to ensure the reliability and integrity of evidence to be
used against an accused in a criminal trial.

Failure to remand

the case to suppress would work to undermine legislative and
judicial checks and balances against the possibility that
unreliable evidence may unfairly used against a criminal
defendant as a result of lax and cavalier procedures that are not
in compliance with established standards and rules.
30

CONCLUSION
It could not be more clearly stated in the Utah
Administrative Code that technicians performing calibration tests
on breath testing machines must report the analytical results of
the known reference sample tests in a permanent record.

Other

UHP technicians have done it, and the UHP is again doing it.
rule seemingly exists nation wide.

It is uncontested that the

administrative rules have therefore not been complied with.
violations are substantial.

The

The

This Court should therefore find

that Mr. Garcia's breath test is inadmissible at trial and remand
his case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this
decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of October, 1997.

^ ^ W ) T f Cr^WTLLIAMS
(^S--<z£ttorney for Defendant/Appellant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
1 BREATH ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 965005558

JOSE A. FIDEL GARCIA,
Judge Atherton
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Results of Breath Test was heard by this Court on 11
April 1997. Present were counsel for both parties, as well as UHP Trooper Scott Hathcock, the
certification/inspection and maintenance officer for the intoxilyzer that was used to test
defendant's breath following his 06 April 1996 arrest for driving under the influence. By
stipulation of the parties, including provision of the pertinent Department of Public Safety
regulations, the Court accepts the following
FACTS
Pursuant to Utah Code § 41-6-44.3 (1996), the Utah Department of Public Safety has
enacted regulations for certifying the accuracy of the "Intoxilyzer" instruments used to measure
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the breath alcohol level of persons arrested for driving under the influence. Those regulations
require, among other things, that the instruments be inspected for accuracy at least every forty
days. Utah Admin. Code § R714-500-6D(3). As pan of these regular ("monthly") inspections,
the certification officer must test the instruments' accuracy in analyzing "known reference
samples/* or "simulator solutions/* R714-500-5B(4)-2(g), which, as these terms imply, are
solutions of known alcohol content. The prescribed accuracy standard for the monthly known
reference sample testing is that the instrument must analyze the sample "within plus or minus
.005 or 5% whichever is greater .. .," R714-500-5B(3).
The regulations further require that the Intoxilyzer 5000 instrument, used in this case,
shall express "all analytical results . . . to three decimal places/* R714-500-6(D)(6); and that the
instrument must read its analytical results *4in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath/' R714500-5B(4)-2(h). These requirements will be hereinafter identified as the "three decimal" and
i4

reads in grams" requirements.
In his Intoxilyzer certification records, documenting the monthly inspection and

maintenance of breath testing instruments, Trooper Hathcock has not recorded the instruments'
exact readings when tested on the known reference samples. Instead of recording a numeric
value for these test results, Trooper Hathcock's certification record simply notes "OK" under the
columns marked "simulator #1," "simulator #2," and "simulator #3. Similarly, the "Intoxilyzer
Affidavits," also commemorating the monthly inspections and utilized as proof of the
instruments' accuracy under the conditions set forth in section 41-6-44.3, contain an entry for
"Checked with known sample," after which Trooper Hathcock checks either a "yes" or a "no"
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space. The Affidavits' uchecked with known sample" entry also includes parenthetical citation
of the prescribed accuracy standard: "(simulator, three tests within + or - .005 or 5% whichever
is the greatest)."
Thus if a simulator solution is known to have a .100 gram per 210 liters alcohol content,
the monthly inspection record and Intoxilyzer Affidavit will indicate "OK" and "yes/* in the
"simulator" and "checked with known sample" spaces, only if the instrument measured that
solution in a range from .095 through .105. Similarly, a .200 known sample must be measured in
a .190 through .210 range. An instrument that does not meet this accuracy standard fails its
monthly inspection, and is withdrawn from service until it is restored to accurate functioning.
Utah Admin. Code § R714-500-5E.
THE PARTIES1 ARGUMENTS
Defendant argues that Trooper Hathcock has inappropriately entered "OK" in his
maintenance record to document the monthly testing on the known reference samples.
According to defendant, the above-cited regulations require Trooper Hathcock, instead of writing
"OK," to record the exact known reference sample measurement, to three decimal places in
grams per 210 liters, in the "simulator" columns of his inspection and maintenance record.
Further, contends defendant. Trooper Hathcock's failure to follow those regulations, so
interpreted, amounts to a constitutional "due process" violation which requires suppression of his
breath alcohol test results in this case.
The State responds that the regulations permit the entry "OK," rather than an exact
numeric reading on the monthly testing. The State further argues that even if Trooper
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Hathcock's "OK" entries violate the regulations, such violation is not of constitutional
dimension. In a similar vein, the State lastly argues that even if there is a failure to follow the
governing regulations, the only remedy to which defendant would be entitled is an order
prohibiting the State from proving by hearsay, i.e., by the Intoxilyzer Affidavits, that the
Intoxilyzer used to test defendant's breath on 06 April 1996 was functioning accurately. Having
considered the parties' memoranda and arguments, this Court now enters its

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The foundational requirement for admission of breath test results, at issue in this case, is
simply that "the instrument used was accurate/* Utah Code § 41-6-44.3(2) (1996). To prove
accuracy of the instrument, documents or memoranda—consisting in this case of Intoxilyzer
Affidavits—may be used in lieu of live testimony. This exception to the hearsay ban is
authorized by section 41-6-44,3, and requires that three conditions be satisified: (1) the
Intoxilyzer Affidavits must reflect compliance with standards for breath testing promulgated by
the Department of Public Safety; (2) the Intoxilyzer Affidavits must be made in the regular
course of, and at or about the time of, the acts commemorated therein (the "acts" being monthly
instrument inspection and maintenance in compliance with the Department's standards); and (3)
the source of the information recorded in the Intoxilyzer Affidavits must be trustworthy. Utah
Code § 41-6-44.3 (paraphrased and reordered). If these conditions are met, there is %Aa
presumption that the test results are valid and further foundation for the introduction of the
evidence [(i.e., the breath test result)] is unnecessary." Utah Code. § 41-6-44,3(3).
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It is this Court's judgment that the foregoing statutory presumption is satisfied by
Trooper Hathcock's method of documenting his monthly accuracy testing of the Intoxilyzer
instruments, which method corresponds to the first of the three above-cited statutory conditions.
Contrary to defendant's contention, the Public Safety Department regulations do not require
Trooper Hathcock to enter the exact results when the Intoxilyzers are tested each month on
known reference samples. Nothing in the wording of the regulations so states. Defendant errs by
attempting to incorporate the "three decimals'* and "reads in grams" requirements into the
requirement that Intoxilyzers be tested on known reference samples. Had the Public Safety
Department intended exact test results to be written in the monthly inspection and maintenance
record, it couid easily have drafted section R714-500-5B(4)-2(g) to state "testing on known
reference samples shall be recorded to three decimal places in grams per 210 liters," or the like.
But the regulation as drafted only requires testing on "known reference samples," and this Court
perceives no need to amend the Department's regulation.
The absence of such need is apparent for several reasons. First, the "three decimals"
requirement, for the Intoxilyzer 5000 instrument, is contrasted in the same regulatory subsection
with a "two decimal places" requirement for the predecessor instrument, the Intoxilyzer 4011,
see R714-500-6D(6). This simply reflects the fact that the newer instrument reads to thousandths
of a gram, whereas the former only read to hundredths of a gram. Thus the "three decimals"
requirement is independent from the "known reference sample" test requirement. Next, the
44

reads in grams" requirement simply states the unit of measurement that must be used—that is,

grams of alcohol per 210 liters. An instrument that gives breath alcohol results in, for example,
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ounces per gallon, no matter how accurate it may be, cannot be used for breath testing in Utah.
Thus the "reads in grams" requirement is also independent of the "known reference sample" test
requirement Finally, proper reading of the monthly inspection and maintenance record, the
Intoxilyzer Affidavits, and the regulatory accuracy standard (R714-500-5B(3)) reveals that the
entry "OK" can only have one meaning: that on the inspection date in question, the instrument
read the known reference sample within the strict .005 or 5% accuracy standard.
Given the strictness of that standard, this Court is satisfied that the statutory conditions
for admission of defendant's breath test results are satisfied. In other words, in order to achieve
the presumption, at trial, that the instrument used to test defendant's breath was accurate, the
State may introduce the Intoxilyzer Affidavits reflecting the instrument's accurate functioning
during its monthly inspections before and after 06 April 1996. No further foundation will be
required for introduction of the breath test results. Because the Court has thus determined that
regulatory and statutory foundational requirements have been satisfied, there is no need to reach
the constitutional challenge raised by defendant (that challenge depends upon an interpretation of
the regulations that this Court has rejected); nor need this Court reach the State's alternative
argument about establishing foundation with non-hearsay evidence. Therefore, it is the Court's
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ORDER
That defendant's motion to suppress is denied.
DATED this 3 * day of
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling was mailed, first class
postage prepaid, on the

day of

, 1997, to the following:

J. Kevin Murphy
Joe A. Greenlief
Attn: DA file No. 96007567
2001 South State, Suite S-3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190

Scott C. Williams
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

District Court Clerk
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APPENDIX B

41-6-44.1

MOTOR VEHICLES

ing while intoxicated statute or ordinance, 93
A.L.R.3d 7.
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of
liability of state or local governmental unit or
ofr e
* ?:J* A.L.R.4th 287.
Validity construction, and application of
statutes directly proscribing driving with
blood-alcohol level in excess of established percentage, 54 A.L.R.4th 149.
Snowmobile operation as DWI or DUI, 56
A.L.R.4th 1092.
Horizontal gaze nystagmus test: use in lmpaired driving prosecution, 60 A.L.R.4th 1129.
Social host's liability for injuries incurred by
third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's
negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16.

Passenger's liability to vehicular accident
victim for harm caused by intoxicated motor*
vehicle driver, 64 A.L.R.4th 272.
Driving while intoxicated: "choice of evilg"
defense that driving was necessary to protect
^ A J J U t h 298
«
h f e Qr
~
T ,
«•„
.
,.
„ w
Co
"f* medicine M mtoxicatmg liquor^ i ^
A
d e r D U I statute
> 6 5 A.L.R.4th 1238.
Horseback nding or operation of hort*
drawn vehicle as within drunk driving statute.
71 A.L.R.4th 1129.
Operation of bicycle as within drunk driving
statute, 73 A.L.R.4th 1139.
Key Numbers. — Automobiles «=» 332

41-6-44.1. Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings.
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the procedures and
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.1, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 142.

41-6-44.2.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 41-6-44.2 (L. 1973, ch.
80, § 2; 1982 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, *> 2), relating to
driving with blood alcohol content of .10% or

higher, was repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 99,
^ 21.

41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence.
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a
person's breath, including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts,
conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument
used was accurate, according to standards established in Subsection (1), are
admissible if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1)
and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption
that the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the
evidence is unnecessary.
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41-6-44.5

MOTOR VEHICLES

History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.4, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 78, § 2; 1993, ch. 83, § 1; 1993, ch.
234, § 33.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment by ch. 83, effective May 3, 1993, added
Subsection (1) and redesignated the remaining
subsections accordingly and made related
changes; inserted "Driver License" preceding
"Division" throughout the section; rewrote
Subsection (2)(a), deleting a reference to Subsection 41-6-44(2); inserted "of the Department
of Public Safety" in Subsection (2)(b)(n)(A);
substituted "Driver License Division" for "department" in Subsection (2)(c)(n); inserted
"driver" in Subsection (6)(a); substituted "Section 32A-12-209" for "Section 31A-12-209" in
Subsection (7)(a)(i); inserted "operator" in Subsection (8Mb); deleted "of the Department of
Public Safety" following "Di vision" and "as defined in Section 62A-8-101" following "authority" in Subsection (ll)(a); and substituted "operator license" for "driver license" or for "license" in Subsection (HKbXi).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 234, effective
July 1, 1993, added Subsections (D(aKi) and
(ii), (l)(c), and (7)(h); rewrote Subsection (2)(a),

deleting a citation to Subsection 41-6-44(2);
substituted "30th day" for "31st day" twice in
Subsection (2)(b)(n); added "of the Department
of Public Safety" in Subsection (2)(b)(ii)(A);
added "Driver License" throughout; substituted "29 days" for "30 days" in Subsection
(7)(a)(i); updated the section citations to reflect
the creation of Title 53; deleted "as defined in
Section 62A-8-101" after "authority" in Subsection (ll)(a); substituted "operator license"
for "driver license" in Subsection (HXbKi); and
made stylistic and designation changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1993, ch. 83, § 2
provides that if both that act and Laws 1993,
ch. 234 pass, then Section 41-6-44.4 of ch. 234
is amended to delete Subsection (l)(a) and insert Subsection (lXa) of ch. 83, to delete Subsection (lXc) referencing § 41-6-44, and to delete Subsection (2)(a) and insert Subsection
(2)(a) of ch. 83.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 78 became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions
for driving under the influence — Weight of evidence.
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material
to prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical
test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence.
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10
does not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of a
defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the alleged
driving or actual physical control, the test result is admissible as evidence of
the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the alleged operating
or actual physical control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight is
given to the result of the test.
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at
the time of the alleged operating or actual physical control.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.5, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 243, § 3; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 15; 1987,
ch. 138, § 39; 1993, ch. 161, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1979,
ch. 243, § 3 repealed former ^ 41-6-44.5, as
last amended by L. 1977, ch. 270, § 1, relating

to chemical tests as evidence and the presumption of blood alcohol level, and enacted present
* 41-6-44.5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, subdivided Sub-
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APPENDIX C

UT ADC R714-500, Chemical Analysis Standards and Training.
*8559 U.A.C. R714-500
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
Public Safety
R714. Highway Patrol
R714-500. Chemical Analysis Standards
and Training.
R714-500-1. Short Title.
A. The short title of this rule shall be ""Rule
for Chemical Analysis Standards and Training."
R714-500-2. Department Activity.
A. The Commissioner of the Department of
Public Safety and his
representatives,
hereinafter ""Department" are authorized by
Section 41-6-44.3 UCA to establish standards
for the administration and interpretation of
chemical analysis of a person's breath, including
standards of training.
R714-500-3. Purpose of Rule.
A. It is the purpose of this rule to set forth: (1)
Procedures whereby the Department may
certify: (a) Breath alcohol testing instruments;
(b) Breath alcohol testing programs; (c) Breath
alcohol testing operators; (d) Breath alcohol
testing technicians; and (e) Breath alcohol
testing program supervisors. (2) Adjudicative
procedure concerning:
(a) Application for and denial, suspension or
revocation of the aforementioned certifications;
(b)
Appeal of initial department action
concerning the aforementioned certifications;
and

Department in
63-46b-3 UCA.

Page 1
accordance

with

Section

R714-500-5. Instrument Certification.
A. All breath alcohol testing instruments,
hereinafter ""instrument", to be used for
evidentiary purposes must be certified by brand
and/or model by the Department.
(1)
The Department will establish and
maintain a list of certified instruments by brand
and/or model for use in the state. The list is
incorporated into R714-500 by this reference.
(2) If application is made for certification of
an instrument by brand and/or model not on the
approved list, the Department shall examine and
evaluate the instrument to determine if it meets
the criteria for certification.
B. In order to be certified each brand and/or
model of breath testing instrument must meet
the following criteria.
(1)
Breath alcohol analysis shall be
accomplished through the principle of infra-red
energy absorption, or any other accepted
scientific principle.
*8560 (2) Breath specimen collected for
analysis shall be essentially alveolar and/or end
expiratory in composition according to the
analysis method utilized.
(3) The instrument shall analyze a reference
sample, such as headspace gas from a mixture
of water and a known weight or volume of
ethanol held at a constant temperature, the result
of which must agree with the reference sample
predicted value within plus or minus .005 or 5%
whichever is greater or such limits as set by the
Department.

(c) Declaratory orders.
R714-500-4. Application for Certification.
A. Application for any certification herein
shall be made on forms provided by the

(4) The specificity of the procedure shall be
adequate and appropriate for the reasonable
analysis of breath specimen
for the
determination of alcohol concentration in law
enforcement. The instrument functions to be

Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.

UT ADC R714-500, Chemical Analysis Standards and Training.
checked shall include, but not necessarily be
limited to the following:
1. Intoxilyzer 4011 series, (a) electrical
power, (b) operating temperature, (c) internal
purge, (d) zero set. (e) printer deactivation, (f)
fixed absorption calibration (if so equipped), (g)
known reference samples, (h) reads in grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 2. Intoxilyzer
5000 series, (a) electrical power, (b) operating
temperature, (c) internal purge, (d) internal
calibration, (e) diagnostic, (f) invalid test, (g)
known reference samples, (h) reads in grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. (5) Any other
tests deemed necessary by the Department to
correctly and adequately
evaluate the
instrument, to give reasonably correct results in
routine breath alcohol testing and be practical
and reliable for law enforcement purposes.
C. Upon proof of compliance with Paragraph
B of this section an instrument may be certified
by brand and/or model and placed on the list of
certified instruments.
(1) Inclusion on the Department's list of
certified instruments will verify that the
instrument by brand and/or model meets the
criteria listed in Paragraph B of this section.
(2) The Department may suspend or revoke
the certification of a brand and/or model of
instrument and remove it from the list of
certified instruments for cause.
D. The Breath Alcohol Testing Program
Supervisor shall determine if the individual
instrument by serial number is the same brand
and/or model that is shown on states in
Paragraph B of this section.
E. After certification if it is determined by the
Department that a specific instrument is
unreliable and/or unserviceable, it will be
removed from service and, certification may be
withdrawn.
*8561 F. It is the intent of this rule that only
certified breath alcohol testing technicians when
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required, shall provide expert testimony
concerning the certification and all other aspects
of the breath alcohol testing instruments under
his/her supervision.
R714-500-6. Program Certification.
A. All breath alcohol testing techniques,
methods, and programs, hereinafter ""program",
must be certified by the Department.
B. Prior to initiating a program, an agency or
laboratory shall submit an application to the
Department for certification. The application
shall show the brand and/or model of the
instrument to be used and contain a resume' of
the Program to be followed.
An on-site
inspection shall be made by the Department to
determine compliance with all applicable
provisions in this rule.
C. Certification of a program may be denied,
suspended, or revoked by the Department if,
based on information obtained by the
Department, Breath Alcohol Testing Program
Supervisor or Breath Alcohol
Testing
Technician, the agency or laboratory fails to
meet the criteria as outlined by the Department.
D. All programs, in order to be certified, shall
meet but not be limited to the following criteria:
(1) The results of tests to determine the
concentration of alcohol on a person's breath
shall be expressed as equivalent grams of
alcohol per two hundred and ten (210) liters of
breath. The results of such tests shall be entered
in a permanent record book for Department use.
(2) Written checklists, outlining the method of
properly performing breath tests shall be
available at each location where tests are given.
Test record cards used in conjunction with
breath testing shall be available at each location
where tests are given. Both the checklist and
test record card, after completion of a test
should be retained by the operator.
(3) The instruments shall be certified on a

Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.
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routine basis, not to exceed forty (40) days, by a
certified breath alcohol testing technician
depending on location of instruments and area
of responsibility.
(4) Calibration tests to certify the instruments
shall be performed by a certified breath alcohol
testing technician using Programs as outlined in
this rule, or those recommended by the
manufacturer of the instruments.
1. Intoxilyzer 4011 series, (a) electrical
power, (b) operating temperature, (c) internal
purge, (d) zero set. (e) printer deactivation, (f)
fixed absorption calibration (if so equipped), (g)
known reference samples, (h) reads in grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 2. Intoxilyzer
5000 series, (a) electrical power, (b) operating
temperature, (c) internal purge, (d) internal
calibration, (e) diagnostic, (f) invalid test, (g)
known reference samples, (h) reads in grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. (5) Results of
tests for calibration shall be kept in a permanent
record book retained by the Certified Breath
Testing Alcohol Technician. A report of each
calibration test shall be recorded on the
approved form and sent to the Breath Alcohol
Testing Program Supervisor.
*8562 (6) All analytical results shall be
expressed in terminology established by state
statute and reported to two decimal places for a
4011 series intoxilyzer, and to three decimal
places for a 5000 series intoxilyzer. (For
example, a result of 0.237g/210L shall be
reported as 0.23 on a 4011 series intoxilyzer, or
0.237g/210L shall be reported as 0.237 on a
5000 series intoxilyzer, or as stated by3" the
Department.
(7) The instrument must be operated by either
a certified operator or technician.
R714-500-7. Operator Certification.
A.
All breath alcohol testing operators,
hereinafter ""operators", must be certified by the
Department.
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B.
All training for initial and renewal
certification will be conducted by certified
Breath Alcohol Testing Program Supervisor
and/or certified Breath Alcohol Testing
Technician.
C. Initial Certification (1) In order to apply
for certification as an operator of a breath
alcohol testing instrument, an applicant must
successfully complete a course of instruction
approved by the Department, which must
include as a minimum the following: a. One
hour of instruction on alcohol and traffic safety,
b. Three hours of instruction on the effects of
alcohol in the human body. c. Three hours of
instruction on the operational principles of
breath testing, d. Two hours of instruction on
the Uniform Alcohol Influence Report Form. e.
Two hours of instruction on testifying in court,
f. Four hours of instruction on the legal aspects
of chemical testing, driving under the influence,
case law and other alcohol related laws. g. Four
hours of instruction on detection of the drinking
driver, h. Four hours of laboratory participation
(performing simulated tests on the instruments
and testing actual subjects.) i. One hour for
examination and critique of course.
(2) After successful completion of the initial
certification course a certificate will be issued
with an expiration date affixed.
D. Renewal Certification (1) The Operator is
required to renew certification prior to its
expiration date. The minimum requirement for
renewal of operator certification will be: a. Two
hours of instruction on the effects of alcohol in
the human body. b. Two hours of instruction on
the operational principles of breath testing, c.
One hour of instruction on the Alcohol
Influence Report Form and testimony of
arresting officer, d. Two hours of instruction on
the legal aspects of chemical testing and
detecting the drinking driver, e. One hour for
examination and critique of course.
*8563 (2) Any operator who allows his/her
certification to expire one year or longer must
retake and successfully complete the initial

Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.
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certification course as outlined in R714- 500-7,
Paragraph C.
R714-500-8. Technician Certification.
A. All breath alcohol testing technicians,
hereinafter ""technicians", must be certified by
the Department.
B. The minimum qualification for certification
as a technician are:
(1) Satisfactory completion of the operator's
initial certification course and/or renewal
certification course.
(2) Satisfactory completion of the Breath
Alcohol testing Supervisor's course offered by
Indiana University, or an equivalent course of
instruction, as approved by the Breath Alcohol
Testing Program Supervisor.
(3) Satisfactory completion of a breath alcohol
testing instruments manufacturer's maintenance/
repair technicians course for the instruments in
use in the State of Utah or is qualified by nature
of his/her employment or training to maintain
and/or repair the instruments in use in the State
of Utah.
(4) Maintain technician's status through a
minimum of
eight (8) hours training each calendar year.
This training must be directly related to the
breath alcohol testing program, and must be
approved by the Breath Testing Program
Supervisor.
(5) Any technician who fails to meet the
requirements of R714-500-8 Paragraph B, Sub
Paragraph (4) must renew his/her certification
by meeting the minimum requirements as
outlined in R714-500-8, Paragraph B Subparagraph (1), (2) and (3).
R714-500-9. Supervisor Certification.
A.

The Breath Alcohol Testing Program
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Supervisor, hereinafter ""supervisor", will be
required to meet the minimum certification
standards set forth in Section R714-500-8.
Certification should be within one (1) year after
initial appointment or other time as stated by the
Department.
R714-500-10. Previously Certified Personnel.
A. This rule shall not be construed as
invalidating the certification of personnel
previously certified as operators under programs
existing prior to the promulgation of this rule.
Such personnel shall be deemed certified,
provided they meet the training requirements as
outlined in R714-500-7 Paragraph D.
B.
This rule shall not be construed as
invalidating the certification of personnel
previously certified as technician under
programs existing prior to the promulgation of
this revised rule. Such personnel shall be
deemed certified, providing they meet the
training requirements as outlined in R714-500-8
Paragraph B Sub-paragraph (4).
*8564 R714-500-11. Revocation or Suspension
of Certification.
A.
The Department may, on the
recommendation of a Supervisor, revoke or
suspend the certification of any operator or
technician:
(1) Who fails to comply with or meet any of
the criteria required in this rule.
(2) Who has falsely or deceitfully obtained
certification.
(3) For other good cause.
R714-500-12. Adjudicative Proceedings.
A. Purpose of section. It is the purpose of this
section to set forth adjudicative proceedings in
compliance with chapter 63-46b UCA.
B. Designation. All adjudicative proceedings

Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.

UT ADC R714-500, Chemical Analysis Standards and Training.
performed by the department shall proceed
informally as set forth herein and as authorized
by sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5 UCA.
C. Denial, suspension or revocation. A party
who is denied certification or whose
certification is suspended or revoked, will be
told by the department the reasons for denial,
suspension, or revocation.
D.
Appeal of denial, suspension, or
revocation. A party who is denied certification
or whose certification is suspended or revoked
may appeal to an individual designated by the
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department on a form provided by the
department in accordance with section 63-46b-3
UCA. The appeal must be filed within ten days
after receiving notice of the department action.
E. No hearing will be granted to the party. The
individual selected by the department will
merely review the appeal and issue a written
decision to the party within ten days after
receiving the appeal.
1990
41-6-44 Notice of Continuation December 1, 1995 63-46b
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